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Almost every state in the United States has a
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.1
This privilege is commonly known by the general
public as "The Fifth Amendment" in recognition of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution which affords the privilege to participants
in federal proceedings. The United States constitu-
tional privilege does not extend to state proceed-
ings, but the privilege is available under the
constitutions of most states. 2 For the sake of sim-
plicity, the privilege against self-incrimination will
be referred to herein as "The Fifth Amendment"
without regard to whether its application in a par-
ticular case derives from federal or state constitu-
tional provisions.
There is little doubt but that application of the
Fifth Amendment today has deteriorated to a
point where judicial decision limiting its abuse is
sorely needed. One need do no more than read the
daily newspaper to realize that witnesses before in-
vestigating committees of Congress and the states,
before grand juries, and in judicial and administra-
tive proceedings generally are often utilizing the
Fifth Amendment not to prevent incriminating
themselves, but to protect others, or as a thinly
veiled way of expressing their contempt for or op-
position to the questioner. It is unfortunate that
authorities of no less stature than Erwin N.
Griswold, Dean of the Harvard Law School, have
to some extent encouraged an unnecessarily broad-
ened interpretation of the Fifth Amendment which
impedes rather than aids sensible application of
constitutional principles in this area.3
It is settled law-if indeed it can be said that
with the current vogue of divided and concurring
opinions and an atmosphere of rapidly changing
1 8 WIGOmRE, EVIDE:NCE §2252 (3d ed. 1940.)
2 See Wyman v. DeGregory, 101 N.H. 171, cerl.
denied, 360 U.S. 717 (1959); In re Pilo, 11 N.j. 8, 93
A.2d 176 (1952); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905); Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1895).
See GRIswoLD, THE F=rH AmENDmENT TODAY(1955).
judicial concepts the law itself is settled-that the
privilege against self-incrimination is personal to
the witness and cannot be used to protect against
the unpleasantness of informing on others.4 Simi-
larly, a person who claims the Fifth in refusing to
answer has no right to do so privately or to prevent
the questioner from making the fact public knowl-
edge.5 That there may follow from such a course
of action certain consequences adverse to the
financial, spiritual, physical or moral interests of
the claimant may be unfortunate, yet this cannot
and should not alter the seriousness and real sig-
nificance of the claim by any witness.6
Under present judicial decisions, claiming the
Fifth Amendment probably does not require a con-
clusion that the witness has been guilty of a crime.
However, it is submitted that the very least it can
mean, if the Fifth Amendment is to continue to be
an effective constitutional arm of the Bill of Rights,
4 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906); McCoRmcK, Evi-
DENCE 269 (1954); 58 Am. JuR., Witnesses, 49.5Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1895); Kiewel v.
United States, 204 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1953); Nelson v.
Wyman, 99 N. H. 33, 105 A.2d 756 (1954); United
States v. Nesmith, 121 F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1954).
6 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1895). See also 8
WXiGmOlE, EviDEN cE §2255 (3d ed. 1940):
"To invoke the sentiments of lofty indignation and of
courageous self-respect against the arbitrary methods of
royal tyrants and religious bigots, holding an inquisition
to enfore cruel decrees of the prerogative, and torturing
their victims with rack and stake, is fitting and laudable
and moves men with a just sympathy. But to apply the
same terms to the orderly everyday processes of the
witness-stand, in a community governing itself in
freedom by the -.vill of the majority and having on its
statute-book no law which was not put there by itself
and cannot be repealed tomorrow-a community, more-
over, cursed above others by constant evasion of the
law and by overlaxity of criminal procedure,-this is to
maltreat language to enervate virile ideas, to abuse true
sentiment, to degrade the Constitution, and to make
hopeless the correct adjustment of the~best motives of
human nature to the facts of life. Were it not so serious
in its implications, it would be as ludicrous a spectacle as
if one were to devote a colossal fortune to founding a
hospital for the care of ablebodied vagrants, or to recite
Milton's Ode to the Nativity at the birth of a favorite
feline's litter."
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is that if the witness answered he might furnish a
link in a chain of evidence that might lead to his
prosecution for a crime not outlawed by the
statute of limitations. The word "conviction" has
not been used at this point. It is conceivable that
facts might be elicited through questioning that,
in the mind of the witness, might give him genuine
apprehension that those responsible for prosecution
in the jurisdiction involved might think he had
committed a crime. If this were so, then should
the witness be compelled to answer out of his own
mouth, he would perforce expose himself to the
risk and even the probability of prosecution-the
very situation which the Fifth Amendment was
designed to prevent.
7
However, the fact that people may well look
askance at a witness invoking the Fifth Amend-
ment should not change the responsibility of the
judiciary to stop the abuse of the Fifth by numbers
of witnesses and, in the process, to halt the
deterioration of public respect for the law which
such abuses have demonstrably created. 8 For ex-
ample, when Dave Beck, the West Coast labor
leader, refused on the grounds of the Fifth Amend-
ment even to acknowledge the presence or identity
of his own son, it was the natural reaction of most
Americans that if this is the law, the law must be
"a ass, a fool."
There is no need for this state of the law. Under
existing decisions of the Supreme Court such a
refusal may understandably be construed as
resting upon fear of the application of the doctrine
of waiver, although the Supreme Court has said in
Rogers v. United States:
"As to each question to which a claim of privilege
is directed, the court must determine whether
the answer to that particular question wouldsub-
ject thewitness to a 'real danger' of further crim-
mination." 9
While the responsibility of the trial court is clear,
it is submitted that too few trial judges have been
willing to utilize this discretionary authority to
enforce a reasonable restraint upon exercise of the
privilege. A "real danger" is not a mere possi-
bility of danger.
Rogers v. United States arose out of a federal
grand jury investigation in Colorado. Books and
records of the Communist Party of Denver were
I Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,486 (1951);
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).8 Cf., O'Conor, The Fifth Amendment: Should a Good
Friend Be Abused?, 41 A.B.A.J. 307 (1955).
9 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951). See also 8 WiosORa,
EVIDENCE §2275 (3d ed. 1940).
the subject of inquiry. Jane Rogers, subpoenaed
duces tecum as treasurer of the Communist Party
of Denver, testified that, by virtue of her office,
she had been in possession of membership lists
and dues records of the Party. Under examination,
Mrs. Rogers denied having possession of the
records, saying she had turned them over to
someone else, but she refused to identify the
person to whom she had given the books, stating
in court as her only reason, "I don't feel that I
should subject a person or persons to the same
thing I'm going through." She was thereupon
found in contempt, committed to the custody of
the marshal, and spent the night in jail. The next
day she appeared with her counsel before the
Grand Jury and claimed the Fifth Amendment in
refusing to disclose the person to whom she had
given the books and records. The District Court's
ruling that her refusal was not privileged and
her sentence of four months in jail was affirmed
by the United States Supreme Court on the theory
that the Fifth Amendment claim was an after-
thought, coming only after she had voluntarily
testified relative to her status as an officer of the
Communist Party of Denver. In short, she had
waived any right to claim the Fifth on that
subject. In so holding, the Supreme Court said,
inter alia, that:
"To uphold a claim of privilege in this case
would open the way to distortion of facts by
permitting a witness to select any stopping-
place in the testimony."' 0
And later in the opinion:
"Disclosure of a fact waives the privilege as to
details.""'
This decision has expectably resulted in situation
after situation where attorneys have advised
witnesses before investigating committees that
the only safe course is to claim the Fifth Amend-
ment very early in the questioning. This results
in scandalously remote refusals, such as failure to
acknowledge whether or not it is snowing outside,
a declination which occurred in the course of an
investigation in New Hampshire. It was considered
virtually hopeless to transfer this refusal to the
courts because of the noticeable reluctance on the
part of the judiciary in the last few years to look
behind the claim of the Fifth Amendment and to
reject it when dearly unreasonably invoked. In a
court's discretion this might be done in camera in
10 340 U.S. at 372.
11 Id. at 373.
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jury cases or off-the-record in issues to court, but
it should be done.
Curiously, there has developed a trend of
editorial, law review, and academic comment in
the direction of an excessive tenderheartedness
toward the motley coterie of Fifth Amendmenteers.
One disturbing aspect of this trend is that this
nation grew to its present position of material
wealth and military power from strength of charac-
ter and firmness of principle by processes foreign to
such an attitude toward pleas of self-incrimination.
Our forefathers wisely inserted the Fifth Amend-
ment in our Constitution in an attempt to prevent
inquisitions of the types so common in Europe at
that time and to protect accused citizens against
being compelled to incriminate themselves under
torture. It was never intended to license perjury,
to exculpate contempt, or to defeat the orderly
processes of constitutional judicial procedure, as
occurs when a witness claims the Fifth Amend-
ment to protect others and not himself, or when
he has committed no crime and knows it And, as
anyone can see from the question itself, he reason-
ably risks no prosecution for crime from his answer.
Some have suggested that the Fifth Amendment
should now be construed solely in terms of subjec-
tive possibilities implicit in the subject-matter
(i.e., leaving it up to the witness to make a final
determination) of the question,12 but if this view
is carried to the point of judicial confirmation, for
all practical purposes a witness might take the
Fifth Amendment with impunity almost in answer
to any possible question because his subjective
decision would leave no objective basis for rejec-
tion.
No one wants to destroy for others or for him-
self the protection against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation that is the plain meaning of the Fifth
Amendment. At the same time, as a lawyer,
member of a State judicial Council, and for three-
quarters of a decade Attorney General of a State,
I have become increasingly aware of growing
public disrespect (particularly among adolescents)
See Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 24 U. Cm. L. Rv. 472, 490
(1957) ("In order to enfore the policies of the privilege a
witness must be free to invoke it whenever the question
is improper, regardless of what his actual answer would
be .... If a question is innocent on its face and is not
designed to elicit incriminating information, the witness
may invoke the privilege provided he can show that one
of the possible answers which is not too remote or
fanciful, would be incriminating. In making this showing
he may refer to extrinsic matters such as his own repu-
tation and the reputations of persons referred to in the
question.")
for law and order, and mounting public cynicism
toward the courts' handling of the Fifth Amend-
ment." It takes nothing from you or me to require
by judicial interpretation that the claim of the
Fifth Amendment shall mean nothing more and
nothing less than that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that a truthful answer if given might
lead to conviction or prosecution for the commis-
sion of a crime within the jurisdiction of the ques-
tioning authority not outlawed by the statute of
limitations. If it be urged that one consequence of
such a judicial interpretation is obloquy o a wit-
ness who claims the Fifth Amendment, candid
observation requires recognition of the fact that
refusal to answer because to answer might incrimi-
nate must involve a certain measure of moral
obloquy per se. At th very least, it means that
the witness may be unduly sensitive to fears of a
risk of prosecution even though not guilty of any
crime. It cannot mean less than this for the claim
of the privilege can' also mean that he has com-
mitted a crime for which he might be convicted
(and which is not outlawed by the statute of
limitations).
Maudlin sentimentality implicit in the view
that "horrors" are heaped upon individual wit-
nesses by being required to take the Fifth Amend-
ment publicly, because the public generally takes
a dim view of the claim, particularly when the
witness is a member of the academic fraternity or
in public service, should not becloud the issue.
Historically, the shoe was on the other foot when
the subject-matter of investigation was economic
cartels, big business, lobbying, or other fields. 4 Not
so, however, when investigations have been probing
to determine the existence of subversion within
and without the academic community. It seems
as though every time the state would inquire into
witether (or not) anyone within the academic
community has conspired, advocated or taught
the overthrow or destruction of state or nation by
force, violence or unlawful means, a type of aca-
demic paranoia manifests itself, routinely sup-
ported by such organizations as the Fund for the
Republic, the American Civil Liberties Union,
and others. Apparently issues of loyalty and
security continue to be violently controversial at
1" See, e.g., the comic strip "Dick Tracy," circa
December, 1959.




home or in the halls of Congress when involving
an element of compulsion. 15
Motivation for the clamor of protestation, most
prolific amongst the academic community, chron-
ically includes such editorial columns as the St.
Louis Dispatch, the New York Tins, the Washing-
ton Post, and the Denver Post, and is usually
along one of the following lines:
(a) The cry of academic freedom that the cam-
puses of America are cloistered incubators in which
governmental inquiry must not tread lest it
discourage the fruits of dissent that ripen on the
tree of intellect.
1 6
(b) Those who urge that freedom of speech and
thought generally is a mainstay of the strength of
America; that no one in his right mind in a free
society would choose Communism or be subversive;
and that the remedy (keeping abreast of potential
subversion) is worse than the malady (subversion)
itself.
(c) Those who assert that America is the last
refuge of proud individualism against state
authority and that compulsory disclosures invade
individual rights of privacy without reasonable
justification, namely, without a showing that
state or national security is sufficiently endangered.
(d) Those to whom the First Amendment (much
less the Fifth) is akin to Valhalla and who urge
that freedom of speech, of press, and of religion,
entirely prohibits such inquiry for all practical
purposes (including the oft-expressed views of no
less than Justices Black and Douglas on the
Supreme Court itself'7).
(e) Those who contend that the personal infamy
and attendant harmful consequences to claiming
l- See the Annual Reports of the American Civi
Liberties Union, 1952 to 1959. See also Porter, The
Supreme Court and Individual Liberties, 48 Ky. L. J.
48 (1959).
There may well develop a difference in terms ofjudicial application of the Fifth Amendment to com-
pulsory testimony, between the "ordinary crimes" such
as larceny, embezzlement, robbery, murder and the
like, and crimes such as treason, sabotage, espionage
and subversion which are recognized as involving a
design to destroy both the Constitution and the courts
themselves. It is not unreasonable to suggest a more
stringent restriction upon availability and application
of the Fifth Amendment when testimony relates to
crimes of the latter category.
16 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957); 1 EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN T UNITED STATES 730 (2d ed. 1958).
17 See DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE (1958);
Black, 3., dissenting, in American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 445 (1950), and Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1951); Solter, Freedom
of Association, 27 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 653 (1959).
the Fifth Amendment publicly (such as loss of job,
harm to reputation or community standing, etc.)
should justify extension of the Fifth Amendment
so that anyone faced with such a loss may properly
plead the Fifth in refusing to answer.
During the days of reaction against certain
excesses on the part of occasional individual
investigating committee chairmen or members,
critics vociferously voiced other objections, such
as guilt by association, hysteria, character assas-
sination, and the like. Not as much is heard of
these cliches nowadays, largely because some of
the sources have apparently felt that they had
severely restricted investigatory powers in the
field of subversion. Recently, since the High Court
reaffirmed state authority to investigate subversion
in the Uphaus case,ms the prime editorial line has
been to urge that a consequence is to revive the
era of the "Fifth Amendment Communist" and
other understandable if lamentable descriptive
epithets of frustrated investigators. Unfortunately,
the intolerance of the liberal left and its blindness
to fact when commenting upon objects of antipathy
provably exceeds in unfairness and abuse of due
process the worst excesses of those who upon
occasion stirred up the situation in the first place.
This editorial theme gains momentum from the
desire of most persons to be free from govern-
mental observation in their private lives and
natural reluctance to inform upon others or to
expose others to such superintendence, a human
weakness not indigenous to America alone.
While the Fifth Amendment itself expressly
refers to criminal cases, its application to non-
criminal proceedings such as Congressional and
state fact-finding investigations is compelled from
its nature. There would be little to commend such
a restrictive interpretation as would hold that
witnesses testifying under oath in extra-judicial
proceedings might be compelled to testify without
restriction upon the use of their testimony in a
subsequent criminal prosecution. However, it is
submitted that a re-examination of the present
status of the Amendment is imperative. It has
been construed and interpreted out of context
with its plain and historically intended meaning,
with a consequent dilution of both its effect and
the respect of citizens for the law.
Members of the bar, whether lawyers or judges,
need to face squarely up to the fact that the Fifth
18 Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959), 100 N.H.
436, 130 A.2d 278, 101 N.H. 139, 136 A.2d 221 (1957).
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Amendment is being repeatedly and intentionally
used by witnesses to cover up a multitude of
improper objections from contempt to perjury. 19
This is not good for the cause of American juris-
prudence, since public confidence in the law and
in our courts is shaken by such antics. The witness
who seeks not to protect himself personally but to
use the Fifth Amendment as a means for protecting
others,-does so contrary to the settled principle
that it is a privilege personal to the witness alone.20
Likewise, the claim of the Fifth Amendment as a
device to protect against conscientious recrimina-
tions or to decline to reveal sources of information,
to avoid publicity, or as a matter of personal
principle, is an abuse. The problem is a serious
one because it affects the moral fiber of basic
American principles; moreover, continued loose
construction of the Amendment gives aid and
comfort to those individuals who with malice
aforethought abuse the privilege, seeking to
frustrate, defeat and stultify the vital fact-finding
function of Congress or state legislatures.21
A grant of immunity from prosecution will
effectively eliminate applicability of the Fifth
Amendment, whether or not the testimony to be
elicited might expose the witness to prosecution
in another, separate jurisdiction.u
But this is an expensive proposition, for the
witness is granted full and complete immunity in
respect to anything he may have done concerning
which he responsively testifies. For this reason, in
most situations relating to possible subversive
activities, the grant would and should be made
only to a witness who is believed to possess con-
siderable information concerning the activity of
others.>
It becomes increasingly obvious in attempting
to achieve a commonsense application of the
Fifth Amendment as applied to disclosures elicited
by questioning in investigations, that certain
fundamentals need to be remembered. Among
these are the fact (1) that an investigation is an
19 See TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 201 (1955); Wil-
liams, Problems of the Fifth Amendment, 24 FoRDA L.
REV. 19 (1955); 8 WIGomoE, EviDENCE, §2279 (3d ed.
1940).20 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1931);
United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
21 See Noonan, Inferences from the Invocation of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 41 VA. L. R~v. 311(1955); 8 WinGmoE, EVmENCE §2272a (3d Ed. 1940).22 DeGregory v. Wyman, 100 N.H. 163, 513, 101
N. H. 82, 171, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 717 (1959).
21Cf., N.H. REv. STArs. ANNoT., c. 588 (1959);
DeGregory v. Wyman, supra note 22.
investigation and is not a prosecution24 ; (2) mere
fact-finding questioning concerning what happened
or what was in fact said or done is neither prior
censorship nor an injunction to conformity, nor a
charge nor an indictment25 ; (3) empirical denials
of ultimate facts under investigation by witnesses
cannot be permitted to preclude relevant cross-
examination to test the truth of the denials nor
shift to the investigating agency the burden of
establishing probable cause for further question-
ing to the satisfaction of the witness.2-
Constitutional amendment limiting the scope
of the Fifth Amendment is unnecessary. The
limitation should come from judicial interpretation.
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has so aptly indicated,
the ultimate final answer to any judicial problem
in the United States is the word of the Supreme
Court of the United States.Y
What appears to be needed specifically is:
A. A Court decision radically limiting the
doctrine of waiver. This can be achieved by a
reversal or strict limitation upon Rogers v. United
States,28 and thus neither a witness nor his counsel
would fear going to the threshold of an incriminat-
ing question before claiming the Fifth Amend-
24 Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).25 See briefs in Wyman v. Sweezy, 100 N.H. 103
(1956).
21 See Ex Parte Senior, 37 Fla. 1, 19 So. 652, 656(1896); Wyman v. Sweexy, 100 N.H. 103, 108 (1956)
(" 'It is not always easy to distinguish teaching or ad-
vocacy in the sense of incitement from teaching or
advocacy in the sense of exposition or explanation.'
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 572. The distinc-
tion is one of fact. The defendant's denial that he advo-
cated, taught or in any way furthered the aim of over-
throwing constitutional government by force or violence
in his lecture is simply his determination of that fact,
which the committee could believe or not as it saw fit.
The witness could not by his answer impose upon the
investigating committee the burden of producing evi-
dence that a doctrine aimed at the violent overthrow of
existing government was in fact advocated by him be-
fore it could inquire of him concerning the lecture.")
Curiously, this undeniable fundamental appears to
have been ignored in the concurring opinion of Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957), where the empirical denials of the
witness Sweezy seem to have been accepted at face
value and considered as having foreclosed further in-
vestigation in the nature of cross-examination. This
point, though not involving the Fifth Amendment di-
rectly, is capable of similar application and should be
cleared up.
2 "Such a judgment must be arrived at in a spirit of
humility when it counters the judgment of the State's
highest court. But, in the end, judgment cannot be
escaped-the judgment of this Court." Frankfurter, J.,
concurring, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
266 (1957).
s 340 U.S. 362 (1951).
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ment.- It is the doctrine of waiver that in large
measure has led to so much public ridicule and
contempt, for when, as the Lord Chancellor of
Great Britain has written in comment upon the
Alger Hiss case, a witness takes the Fifth Amend-
ment on the question of whether he plays tennis or
is a member of the American Legion, for fear of
waiver, it is carrying things too far.3° In this con-
nection, it should make no difference whether the
witness has denied or affirmed essential criminal
facts in his previous answers. He should be per-
mitted to take the Fifth in not replying to any
question without fear that his previous answers
shall constitute a waiver of his right to later claim
the Fifth Amendment, provided always that the
requirements of the next sub-paragraph (B) exist
in the claim of the Fifth.
B. Judicial decision should affirm that a plea of
the Fifth Amendment means that the witness,
acting honestly, has reasonable grounds to believe
that if he answered truthfully such an answer
might furnish a link in a chain of evidence that
night lead to his conviction or prosecution for a
crime not outlawed by the statute of limitations.
The decision should affirm explicitly that the link
is not in the realm of speculative possibility but
rather of discernible and reasonable probability,
reasonably obvious to the trial court or questioner
on the face of the record. The decision should
reaffirm that a claim of the Fifth Amendment for
reasons beyond the foregoing, whether tested by
the question or tested by the possible answer, is
improper and-as Chief Justice Marshall once
said-"in conscience and in law as much a perjury
as if he had declared any other untruth-upon his
oath."'" (This requirement assumes that the
resolution empowering the investigating agency
has been found to be constitutional and the ques-
tion itself relevant thereto.)
"I This would constitute a substantial adoption of the
English law. See Annot., Self-Incrimination , Waiver, 95
L. ED. 2d 354, 360 (1951); Annot., Self-Incrimination-
Waiver as to Details, 147 A.L.R. 255, 263 (1943).30 JowITT, Tm STRANGE CASE Or ALGER Hiss 142
(1953).
21 United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38 (1807).
C. State legislation empowering the granting of
immunity to the witness when it seems necessary
and advisable to do so.
D. Specific judicial disapprobation and limita-
tion upon use of the Fifth Amendment for sub-
jective reasons of conscience, dislike of the ques-
tioner or the question, or disinclination to inform
on others.
E. Legislation establishing for federal and
state agencies the judicial transfer that applies in
New Hampshire, i.e., that whenever a witness
declines to answer or refuses to obey a subpoena
or to produce documents, the administrative agent
or committee may then transfer the matter by
petition to any Justice of the Superior Court, who
shall then continue with the matter in court as
though the original proceedings had been com-
menced in court. In this way, long and protracted
delays in judicial determination of constitution-
ality, relevancy, and appropriateness of the claim
of the Fifth Amendment, may be promptly secured
and the witness assured of constitutional protec-
tions in the process.?"
A liberal injection of judicial common sense into
the never-never land that has repeatedly charac-
terized invocation of the Fifth Amendment in
recent years is genuinely needed, particularly in
the field of legislative and congressional investiga-
tions. Such a doctrine would be a step forward for
American jurisprudence, and would do much to
restore public confidence in the law. Carefully
phrased and properly handled in the trial court,
it will neither limit nor destroy any of our essen-
tial or traditional freedoms.
12 N.H. Rv. STATS. ANNOT., c. 491, §§19 and 20:
"19. Petition. Whenever any official or board is given
the power to summon witnesses and take testimony, but
has not the power to punish for contempt, and any
witness refuses to obey such summons, either as to his
appearance or as to the production of things specified
in the summons, or refuses to testify or to answer any
question, a petition for an order to compel him to
testify or his compliance with the summons may be
filed in the superior court, or with some justice thereof.
"20. Procedure. Upon such petition the court orjustice shall have authority to proceed in the matter as
though the original proceeding had been in the court,
and may make orders and impose penalties accord-
ingly."
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